Te~ranakr lndustrral Orstncts) Borlermakers ct at Socrety (hereafter. the Borlermakers Socrety ) both applred to the Regrstrar of lndustrral Unrnns for regrstrahon as rndus· trral unrons of workers under s 163 and 164 of the lndustnal Relatrons Act 1973
In each case the Reg1strar declrned to accept the applrcatron on the grounds that members of the respectrve applicants mrght convenrently belong to a then exrst rng unron s 168 (2) In the case of the Assocratron !herr mr:!mbership mrght con venren!ly belong to frve exrstrng unrons The Supreme Court has held that words uch those rn s 168 (2) whrch rmport the rngur ub .ume the plural see the Totalisator Workers· case, noted rn thrs rournar "'' 1 Q 7 6) 1 N Z J I A 45 Both the A. socra110n d the Borlermakers Socrety dppealed to he tndustrra/ Court under s 1\l8 '4) of the Act
The appear of tho Assocratron whrch was pposed by rnter alra Clencal Workers·, f:ngrneers· Electrrc3J Workers· and Store-IE'n and Packers I U W resembles srmrlar c~ppears noted at (1976J 1 N Z J.l A 45 and between 'hrgher authonty ' on vne hand and ·unronrsed labour on the other Jamreson J also noted that only 'a marorl!y of the Assocratron members could belong o '1ne of the frve exrstrng umon .. Agarnst the ppeat. however the Court round. as a fatal flaw rn the applrcatron, that the membershrp rules of the Associatron were ambrguous In addrtron certarn other workers mrght garn only a revo/vrng door. rn-and-out. sort of membershrp due to salary bar rules in other unions. Wrthout oromrsrng future favourable treatment, Jamrcson J rnt1mated that rf problems regard10g membershrp clauses were cured. then future applrcatrons by the Associatron mrght prove successful
The appeal of the Borlermakers Socrety however was a completely drflerent matter Although runsdrctron of the lndustna/ Court was sought under the regrstratron section of the Act vrs a VIS the decrsron of the Regrstrar. the Court found that the applrca~ Iron to the Regrstrar and the appeal to the Court were really part of a transparent subterfuge to avord and evade the dereg•s~ trat1on order of the Mmrster of Labour, as gazetted on 3 September 1976 Albert the appellant Socrety called •Isert the ' North Island (except Northern and Taranakr Drs· tricts) Boilermakers" and the deregrstered unron had been the ''WeJ/rngton Orstrict Boilermakers, the Court no1ed that there were only three 1ndustrra1 drstncts rn the North Island. and the Society's exclusron of the Northern nnd Taranaki Oistrrcts left prec1se1y the Wellrngton D1strrct The Court concluded thai the appeal was real ly an allempl to re-reg1sler a dereg1stered un~on and thai the controlling sect1on of the lndustnal Relat1ons Act was not s 168. but s 130
That taller sect1on proh1b1ts the registratiOn of a umon 1n the locality and in the industry ol a dereg1stered union until the Min~ster of Labour so consents. Therefore, the Ind ustrial Co urt had no jurisdic tion to advise the Registra r to reg 1ster the applicant society or eve n co nsider the ments or an appeal unde r s 168. The consequences of deregistration are also noted 1n another lndustnal Court dec1s1on regard mg the Boilermakers, noted at (1975) 1 N Z. Recent Law 312 . Th is decision represents the first repo rted ;udi cial consideration of section 128 of The industrial Relations Act 1973. as amended by section 3 ol the Industrial Relat ions Amendment Act 1976 . The purpose of th1s section was to create an employer's power of wspension . respectmg ··salary wages, allowances. or other emolument5.' for nonstriking employees. when that employer is unable to prov1de such emp loyees with work because of a strike by any other workers. In its onginal lorm the employer was to give 1 week's not1ce of any such suspension , however, because of the effective tactic of co-ordmated seriatim one-day strikes by several unions. the Government simply deleted the notice requirement by the 1976 Amendment. (II an employer's business Involved, say. five unions. by coordinating their one-day strikes , the unions could shut down the employer for a full week, while each worker was enlltled to four days' pay)
SUSPENSION OF NON-STRIKING WORKERS
The instant case concerns a lengthy strike by the Storemen and Packers IUW , and subsequent suspens1on of members or the Paint and Varn1sh IUW By acting promptly under section 128 (3) the union appealed the suspension to the Industrial Court That section contains no reference to any burden or proof for the appellant un1on of the respondent employer but apparently Jam1eson J . round the employer had the fmal burden of coming forward with evidence, because Jam.eson J concluded that the employe• · h?s JU Stified its act1ons This fU $IIflcation was show n by the delay 1n suspend1n~ the workers 1n question . The first suspens1 c n took place some three weeks after the strike began , funher suspens1ons took place four weeks after the strike commenced. and some paint and varn~sh workers were not suspended at al l These facts apparently demonstrated the bona fide allilude of the employers regardmg the provision of work for non-striking employees, and unresolved matte rs of fact (such as overcrowded storage areas, safety workmg room , etc .) were viewed favo ura b ly toward the employer, on the ground that . some degree of JUdgment must be left to the employer who is faced with such a Situation . ' The un~on appeal was therefore dism1ssed . Th1s personal gnevance case wh1ch comes to the Court through the standard procedure set out in section 117 (4) of the Act. makes no new law. but is a useful Illustration of the judicial flexibility provided by secllon 117 (7) The worker 1n question had a bad work record both at the Harbour Board, and at the container termrnal. where he had been seconded for more highly paid work. After h1s eleventh unexcused absence from work. he was stncken from the container termmar roster and sent back to h1s parent employer, the Harbour Board. where he was summan/y dlsm•ssed for mtsconduct. although apparently gratuitously g1ven two weeks pay 1n lieu of not1ce
The Court found that he had been an unsattsfactory employee, but nevertheless. he had been unJuStifiably dtsm1ssed Hts removal from the contamer termmal was a considerable punishment in tlself: and in ltght of hts record, the court ordered that he be reinstated (s. 117 (7) (b) ) to ordinary Harbour Board employment but without compensation (s 117 (7) (c) ) or reimbursement of losl wages (s 117 (7) (a) J The umon then put forward a claim lor extra annual leave lor these "on call· workers. Such a claim would have seemed a claim lor an Increased rate of compensation. as del1ned by Regulation 4 (2) which proVIdes that a reduction 1n hours shall be treated as an mcrease in rate of remuneration. Such a claim would, therefore, pnma facie ord1nanly be negotiated during a dispute of interest. However, the union raised the claim as a dispute of right, to be heard by a Disputes Comm1ttee, set up pursuant to Clause 30 of the Award noted supra That d1sputes clause IS, of course, identical to the model set out 1n s 116 of the Act . The Chairman of the Disputes Committee decided that each "on call" electrician was to be awarded an extra day's leave for each seven weeks period of "on call" duty. This decision by the Chairman was promptly appeaTed by the employer to the industrial Court; the employer there challenged the propnety of using a section 116 Disputes Committee for such a purpose. Each party consulted 1ls central organiZation, and it was agreed to state a case for the Court of Appeal, pursua'nt to s 51 of the Act
The questions wh1ch were settled between counsel and accepted by Judge Jamieson to be put to the Court of Appeal were as follows
(1) Is a dispute which relates to a matter which has been dealt w1th '" the sa1d Collective Agreement and specifically and clearly disposed of by its terms capable of being a 'dispute of rights' to which the procedure set out in Clause 30 of the said Collective Agreement can apply? (2) In deal1ng w1th a dispute under the procedure provided by Clause 30 of the said Collective Agreement has the Committee power to make a decision which involves amending during the currency of the said Agreement, a provision of the Agreement dealing with, and disposing specifically and clearly of the matter in dispute?"
The Court of Appeal answered "No" to each of these questions· 6 September 1977 CA 35/77, noted at (1977 3 N Z Recent Law 318. The matter then returned to the Industrial Court for further consideration Two basic problems emerged in the second hearing in the Industrial Court. First, the litigants, or rather the respondent union, appeared to shift factual ground upon reappearance by submitting that the extra annual leave had not been discussed and settled unfavourably to the union in the dispute of interest of December 1975; the un1on consequentially argued that the question of extra annual leave for "on call" workers was not settled ·specifically and clearly by the Award. By sh1ft1ng the focus of the dispute, the union successfully prevented the Court of Appeal JUdgment from being dispositive of their claim.
Secondly, the Court found difficulty in statutorily distinguishing the two species of the genus dispute. While the defimt1on of "Dispute of right" 1n section two of the Act defines Dispute of right, inter alia, as ·any dispute that is not a dispute of Interest," the provisions 1n Part VII of the Act, "Procedures for Settlement of Disputes of Rights" do not subsume that definition. In other words, the model disputes clause contained in s 116 of the Act (read together with the personal grievance provisions of s 117) does not dispose of all possible disputes which are other than disputes of Interest, and it may be poss1ble to raise a dispute of right which has no settlement procedure In this case the union argued that the claim for extra annual leave was covered by subsection (1) (b) of the model disputes clause, being a matter " related to matters dealt with (in the Award). "
Mr Justice Jamieson agreed with the Court of Appeal in finding no problem with the clarity of the Award, but he found that the Award did not ·specifically'· (i.e., expressly) deal with the "on call workers' annual leave entitlements. In other words, Mr Justice Jamieson chose to interpret the adverbial construction "specifically and clearly" disJUnctively, emphasizing the separate meanIng of each word, and not conjunctively The Court then found that as the Award was •·qUite silent" as to the leave entitlement in question, the matter had not been "specifically" disposed of by the Award The Disputes Clause was properly invoked, and the Dispute Committee, its Chairman, and the Court. had jurisdiction to deal with the said dispute 
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warnings Men rnvolved for the frrst lime were not dismrssed, but were grven a srmrlar warnrng Pursuant to that set of facts, two pleas were brought to the court.
The frrst applicatron was in the name of Mr Hori. but it really was a test case for the benefit of all 135 dismrssed men, under the model personal gnevance clause set out rn s t 17 of the Industrial Relations Act 1q73 And therein lay applicants first rn-.surmountable obstacle That model clause has no valrdity unless set out in an agreement wh1ch brnds the aggrieved worker's employer The parent agreement in thrs case was the New Zealand {except Nelson and Westland) Timber Workers Collective Agreement, dated 17 November 1977, as mcorporated in an undated 'Regional Agreement between the State Services Commissron (acting for the Crown, or more particularly for the Forest Service) and the Union By paragraph 1 of that "Regional Agreement · the parttes agreed to observe the above-mentioned collective ag reemen t Clause 26 of that agreement, in turn, incorporates the model clause of section 117 tncludJng section 3A as provided by sectron 19 of the 1976 Amendment. However, insofar as that clause purports to bind this employer, as a Government Department .. or Jo g1ve the lndustnal Court JUnSdiCIIon over the Crown . 1t is a simple nullity, by the terms ol s 218 of the Act. which reads as lollows '218. Act not to apply to Crown or Government Departments -Except as provided by sections 216, 217 and 233 ol lhis Act or by the spec1al provisions of any other Act. nothmg 1n th1s Act shall apply to the Crown or to any Department of the Government of New Zealand
Having noted that complete bar to the JUrisdiction of the Industrial Court to hear Hori's application Jamieson J. then heard it regardless. because "there are human problems concerned in this matter It m1ght be said. therefore. that Jamieson J . pre1Bnded to hear the case. to give the applicant the sat1sfact1on of a day in court, albeit, had the Court ruled in Hon·s favour 1t would have been unable to provide a remedy Jam1eson J . then ru led aga1nst the personal gnevance claim on two grounds : First, Han had proceeded Without his union. under subsection 3A of section 117 as amended 1n 1976. That prov1s1on can be activated only when there is a " failure on the part of the worker's union . . " to pursue the claim . Jamieson J. found however. that Hori s applicatiOn was flawed because Hori had never approached the union, and , m fa c t. "he had not given a thought to th1s .
' Therefore i t could not be said that the union. however ill· disposed it might be toward Mr Hori , had failed to pursue the claim . Mr Hori had never told them about it.
Secondly , Jamieson J found that , on substance. the d1sm1ssal was neither wrongful nor unjustifiable In the words of the Court , 'The dismissal came about because the applicant and his associates were continually , and m an unauthorised and improper manner, disrupting the work of the mill ."
Assuming that lhe Court had jurisdiction (wh1ch 1t did not) , and assuming that Han had standing (which he did not) , the Court found that the employer's power to dismiss in this case was " beyond doubt
The second application was made pursuant to section 119C of the Commerce Act 1975. as inserted by the Commerce Amendment Act of 1976. Hori argued that the mass dismissal of 135 men at the Wa1pa mill const1tuted a lockout (as defmed by ~ection 124 of Industrial Relations Act 1973). whereby (per s 119C (1) (b) ) "The economy of a particular industry .
• . is senously affected or 1t is clearly ev1dent that 1t will be senously affected m the 1mmediate future, by a strike or lockout . . " That sect1on provides that the Court can order a "resumption of the operat1on of any undertakmg," which 1n th1s case would mean a restorat1on to their employment of the 135 men. (Although the court d1d not refer to the JUriSdiCtional 1ssue regarding this second application, sect1ons 119D and 119E of the Commerce Act satisfy the reqUirements of s 218. supra be1ng ·special provisions" of another statute) .
The Court found against this second application on two grounds. F~rst. the dismissal of the 135 men was not, 1n fact. a lockout. because. in terms of s 124 of the Industrial Relat1ons Act 1973. the motive of the employer was not to compel! the workers to accept terms of employment or comply w1th any demands made by the employer As the d1sm1ssal in th1s case could not amount to a lockout, s 119C had no application .
Secondly. the court found that. even assuming the dismissal were a lockout, the substantive terms of s 119C were not met. At the t1me of the heanng the work at the mill was proceeding in a normal manner and the Court would assume that the law would be abided by in the future. Therefore the timber Industry was not seriously affected at the lime of the hearing, the court could not find clear evidence that it would be seriously affected in the immedIate future, and no resumpt1on order could be issued Mr Justrce Barker 1n the Supreme Court at Auckland. 1ssued an exparte InJunction to the pla1nt1ff aga1nst the ten ftrst defend· dnts. officers and executive• of the union. to restra1n them from executing any contract of employment on behalf of the un1on (second defendant) Without firo;t obtaining n rAsolullon of a spec1a1 meeting of the un1on The JUdiCial order was based on a 
